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Abstract: The paper reviews the recent conduct of monetary policy and the central 
bank’s rule-based behavior in Russia. Using different policy rules, we test whether 
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The last ten years have witnessed an upsurge in research on monetary policy 
rule evaluation motivated by the seminal paper of Taylor (Taylor, 1993). 
Following this study, a great number of researchers have investigated the 
Federal Reserve’s (the US Central Bank) behavior using either a simple Taylor 
rule or some simple variations thereof, like including lags of short-term interest 
rate or output deviations. Overall, for the US or other developed countries, the 
Taylor rule explains rather well the behavior of central banks. Most of the time 
they stabilize deviations either from a target level inflation or output gap, using 
an interest rate instrument. 
However, in the case of developing countries and emerging markets, the 
findings of monetary policy rule evaluations are somewhat inconsistent, with 
results changing, depending upon time span and model specification (Mohanty 
and Klau, 2003). This can be explained by several facts: given the specific 
nature of markets in emerging economies, the adequate policy instrument could 
not only be the short-term interest rate, but also the monetary base (a McCallum 
rule) or the exchange rate (a Ball rule). Additionally, the inclusion of the 
exchange rate in the central bank’s reaction function does not contradict the 
objectives of central banks, if exchange rate stabilization is a precondition for 
both output stabilization and bringing down inflation to a targeted level (Taylor 
2000).   2 
Over the past few years a number of studies have investigated monetary 
policy rules in emerging markets, finding that even with some shortcomings, 
central banks in emerging markets follow also some rule-based monetary policy, 
and that an open-economy version of the Taylor rule can describe much of the 
variation in short-term interest rates (Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003, 
Minella et al., 2003, Mohanty and Klau, 2003, Taylor 2002 and Torres Garcia, 
2003).  
It is, however, not clear whether this applies to transition economies, 
where financial markets are even less developed and where the implementation 
of a money-based monetary policy may face institutional problems. Because of 
even greater model specification difficulties and problems associated with 
collecting reliable data, very little research has been done on monetary policy 
rules in transitional economies. This study is one of the first attempts to fill this 
gap, as it examines the conduct of monetary policy in Russia during the period 
of 1993–2002. The empirical estimation of alternative rules for monetary policy 
allows a test of the statement that in financially less developed economies, 
monetary targeting rules can provide an effective description of the behavior of 
the monetary authorities –and, in the case of Russia, of its stated objectives (see 
Taylor, 2000). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
evolution of the monetary policy instruments and the monetary regime followed 
by the Russian central bank in a chronological order. Section 3 specifies 
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different empirical models to be used in evaluating monetary policy rules, while 
Section 4 presents the results of our empirical estimations. Finally, Section 5 
draws some conclusions.  
2.  Development of Monetary Policy in Russia  
The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 did not immediately lead 
to the establishment of a truly Russian monetary authority (the Bank of Russia, 
or CBR), capable of conducting an independent and effective monetary policy,2 
as, until mid 1993, some of the former republics of the Soviet Union still used 
the rouble, the Russian national currency, and central banks of those republics 
conducted their own credit policy simultaneously with the Bank of Russia. Only 
after 1993 the Bank of Russia started to conduct its own independent monetary 
policy, although the scope of the policy was limited by the need to finance a 
huge budget deficit, mainly caused by a dramatic decline in output (see Figure 
1). This loose monetary stance continued until the mid of 1995, when the 
Russian economy started showing signs of stabilization and a new law on the 
2   The Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) was founded on 13 July 
1990, based on the Russian Republic Bank of the State Bank of the Soviet Union. On 2 
December 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR passed the Law “On the Central Bank 
of the RSFSR (Bank of Russia)”, which declared the Bank of Russia a legal entity and the 
main bank of the Russian Federation. 
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Bank of Russia was passed, providing some degree of legal independence to the 
Bank of Russia in conducting monetary policy.3  
These positive developments allowed the Bank of Russia to adopt a 
tighter monetary policy and to introduce a pegged exchange rate regime with a 
crawling band against the US dollar, from July 1995 onwards. As a result of 
these measures inflation slowed down (see Figure 2). Furthermore, because of 
favorable developments in the local securities market, direct credit to the 
government significantly decreased and the Bank of Russia started to conduct 
monetary policy through indirect instruments, such as interest rates and reserve 
requirements. However, the start of the Asian crisis of 1997 spread a negative 
shock throughout emerging markets. This external shock decreased investment 
confidence in Russia and caused capital outflows, forcing the Bank of Russia to 
defend the band. Although during the exchange market interventions in 
November 1997 the Bank of Russia lost over $6 billion of its liquid reserves, 
which was equal to two thirds of total reserves at that time, the exchange band 
was successfully defended for a while.  
Despite these efforts of the Bank of Russia, due to the severe financial 
crisis of August 1998, the government was forced to default its domestic debt 
3   Nevertheless, still today the Bank of Russia maintains some functions not traditionally 
seen as belonging to a central bank: for instance, in spite of being a banking supervisor 
and regulator, the CBR has a majority stake in the largest Russian bank (and state owned 
bank), Sberbank Rossii, which has 23 percent of all banking assets, 70 percent of 
household deposits, 20 percent of corporate deposits and 21,000 branches across Russia, 
and, until late 2002, also had participation in the second largest state owned bank, the 
VTB. Further, acting as an agent for the Ministry of Finance, it set up and manages the 
government securities market, known as the GKO market. 
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obligations. The rouble was devalued and the exchange rate band was 
abandoned, leading to the adoption of a “dirty” floating regime (see Figure 3, 
where a de facto targeting of the nominal exchange rate after 1998 seems 
apparent).4 One consequence of the sharp depreciation was a rapid acceleration 
in inflation. Although rouble-denominated debt was restructured, investor 
confidence kept declining because of an increase in political uncertainty and 
private capital outflows. In such a situation, the Bank of Russia, fulfilling its role 
as a lender of last resort, attempted to preserve the payment system, which came 
to a halt during this period, by injecting liquidity into banking system through a 
reduction of reserve requirements and extending large amount of new credits. 
However, base money declined significantly in real terms, reflecting the sharp 
decline in output and increased use of non-monetary forms of payment. 
4   This indicates that the choice of a flexible exchange rate regime would have been welfare 
improving for Russia, due to the shock-absorbing properties of such regimes –conditional 
on the quality of institutions and on the consistency of the policy mix (Vinhas de Souza 
and Ledrut, 2003)– and given the higher propensity of commodity-based economies to be 
buffeted by external shocks. Also, the higher vulnerability of hard peg regimes to crises 
(Babula and Otker-Robe, 2003) would indicate that, contrary to earlier studies (Dabrowski 
et al., 2002) a mere flexible exchange rate regime would have been better for Russia. 
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As a consequence of the inflationary pressures, in 1999 one of the main 
objectives of the Bank of Russia was to bring inflation down, initially to 30 
percent and later to a 12–14 percent range, while keeping output decline in the 
range of 1–3 percent, within the framework of a “dirty float”5 of the rouble. To 
achieve this objective, monetary policy was tightened by reducing net credit to 
banking system. Because of this measure, inflation fell sharply and the exchange 
rate depreciation stopped. Furthermore, fiscal performance significantly 
improved, due to the approval of a new package of fiscal measures and 
improvements in revenue collection. As world energy prices increased (over 
50% of Russia’s exports are of energy-related products –oil and gas), resulting 
in trade surpluses, renewed capital inflows and a resumption of growth in 
5   See the classification of Edwards and Savastano (1999). 
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Russia. The effects of these developments on the (real) exchange rate caused it 
to become one of the main targets of monetary policy (see Figure 3). 
According to the Bank of Russia, the main objective of its monetary 
policy in 2000 was to reduce inflation to 18 percent and to achieve an annual 
growth rate of GDP of 1.5 percent. However, the continuing strength of the 
balance of payments and the Bank of Russia’s reluctance to permit a real 
appreciation of the rouble has placed increasing pressure on monetary policy. 
Given this continued favorable economic situation in recent years, the Bank of 
Russia has placed more weight on the exchange rate stability, while accepting 
the inflationary consequences of such a decision. This policy of the Bank of 
Russia has slowed the real appreciation of the rouble and reduced inflation, even 
though the pace of disinflation has been slower than the one formally targeted 
by the authorities.6  
3.  Specification of the Empirical Model 
As described above, since 1991 the Russian economy has experienced both 
sharp fluctuations in main macroeconomic variables and deep structural 
changes. Given this unstable nature of the economic environment in Russia, the 
task of estimating a monetary policy rule is complicated and no single policy 
6   The policy relevance of such concerns with real appreciation are somewhat doubtful, as is 
unclear if the real exchange rate of the Russian rouble is above its long run equilibrium 
value, or merely recovering from an undershooting (see IMF, 2003). 
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rule equation might fully capture all aspects of the central bank behavior during 
this period. Therefore, we will estimate different types of rules, described below. 
The recent literature on monetary policy rules primarily distinguishes two types 
of instrument rules: interest rate based instrument rules and monetary based 
instrument rules, referred to as the Taylor rule and the McCallum rule 
(McCallum, 1988), respectively.7 The key difference in these rules involves the 
choice of the instrument in central bank’s reaction function in response to 
changes in macroeconomic conditions. While the Taylor rule, which uses a 
short-term nominal interest rate as an instrument, is widely used in monetary 
policy estimations because of its simplicity, the McCallum rule uses the growth 
rate of monetary base as an instrument, which figured prominently in monetary 
policy formulation before the nineties.8 
Originally, both rules were designed to be used in the evaluation of the 
monetary policy in large industrial countries, and many observers expressed 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of this basic policy rules in evaluating the 
conduct of monetary policy in emerging economies. This concern raises the 
question as to what kind of modifications are needed to fit better the realities of 
emerging economies, with underdeveloped financial markets, dependence on 
7   Razzak (2001) shows that the McCallum and Taylor rules are, as one should expect, co-
integrated. 
8   Perhaps the most traditional of those quasi “monetary targeters” was the German central 
bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank (more precisely, the Bundesbank announced M3 as an 
intermediate target –“Zwischenziel”, it did not use it as an instrument or operational 
target). Several works (see, for instance, Clarida and Gertler, 1996) put into question the 
reliance of the Bundesbank on monetary aggregates even during its “golden age”. 
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primary commodity exports, sharp swings in productivity and relative prices, 
and high exposure to volatile capital flows.  
To address adequately this question, researchers use modified versions of 
these instrument rules. One general consensus in this regard is that monetary 
policymakers in emerging economies are more concerned about exchange rate 
movements than those in mature economies (for instance, see Williamson, 
2000), among other reasons due to the degree of exchange rate pass-through to 
prices. Hence, the exchange rate has been incorporated, resulting in the open 
economy version of the central bank’s reaction function.9 Moreover, some 
researchers, such as Ball (1998), even suggest that in a small open economy the 
central bank could use a weighted average of the nominal interest rate and the 
exchange rate as an instrument. However, this type of “hybrid rule” has not been 
popular among empirical researchers because of uncertainties involved in 
determining weights.10  
Taylor rule 
In his seminal work, Taylor (1993) proposed the following, now well known, 
policy rule to describe the Fed’s behavior in setting the short term interest rates: 
i = π + 0.5y + 0.5(π – 2.0) + 2.0  (1) 
9   Detken and Gaspar (2003) show that a monetary authority that cares about price 
deviations will also care about exchange rate developments, even without formally 
targeting those. 
10  Ball-type rules are hybrid rules, related to the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) literature 
(see Freedman, 1996). An MCI is an indicator of the stance of monetary policy, which 
does not only consider an output target but also the influence of the exchange rate on 
inflation. 
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where i is the short term interest rate, π  is the inflation over the four previous 
quarters, y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target (or “output gap”). 
The inflation target and the equilibrium real interest rate are set at 2.0 and 
assumed as constant over time. The “policy maker” is here assumed to care, 
with equal weights, about deviation of inflation and output from target. In this 
formulation Taylor used a linear trend to approximate potential output. 
This simple equation cannot be estimated in the original form in the case 
of Russia, since a relatively stable long-run average inflation does not exist. The 
only way to estimate equation (2) is to assume that there is a constant intercept 
and estimate the coefficients by running a simple regression without specifying 
the other parameters of the model. Our initial results, where the output gap was 
calculated by using a linear de-trending approach gained unsatisfactory results, 
so we recalculated the output gap making use of a different approach, namely 
the traditional Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.11  
Following Taylor (2001), we estimate the modified open economy Taylor 
rule below:  
01 2 3 4 15 1 tt t t t t i y xr xr i u ββ π β β β β −− =+ + + + + +
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,             (2) 
11  The HP filter is the usual method to “smooth-out” the estimate of the long-term trend 
component of a series. It is a two-sided linear filter that computes a smoothed series, 
denoted by os, of an original series, denoted by yhp below, by minimizing the variance of y 
around os, subject to a “penalty parameter” that constrains the second difference of os. 
That is, the HP filter chooses ost as to minimize 
 
The penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness of the series. The larger the λ used, the 
smoother the series ost will be. The HP filter has known limitations on short samples and 
also on its estimated end sample. 
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where   is the growth of the real effective exchange rate,   is a white noise 
error term and t-1 indicates the past values of the variables. The remaining 
variables are the same as in the equation (2). The expected signs of the 
parameters are as follows:  ,  ,   > 0, ,  , and   < 0.  
t xr t u
0 β 2 β 5 β 1 ) 1 /( 5 1 > −β β 3 0 β< 4 β






Money based rules 
As discussed in Section 2, the short-term interest rate has not been the most 
important instrument in conducting monetary policy in Russia.12 Uncertainty in 
measuring real interest rates and big shocks to investment or net exports may 
make monetary aggregates a preferred instrument. This may be the case in 
Russia, especially at the beginning of the nineties. 
The McCallum rule can be expressed as follows: 
          (3) 
where   is the rate of growth of the monetary base in percent per year, ∆ is 
the target rate of growth of nominal GDP, in percent per year,   the rate of 
growth of base velocity, in percent per year, and averaged over the previous four 
years in the original McCallum estimation, and  is rate of growth of nominal 
GDP in percent per year. In this rule the target value of nominal GDP growth is 
calculated as the sum of the target inflation rate and the long-run average rate of 
growth of real GDP. 
12  Currently the Bank of Russia officially adopts a money supply –aggregate M2– as an 
intermediate anchor to policy. 
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Despite the problems associated with the direct control of the M1 
monetary aggregate and significant fluctuations in money velocity, we will use 
this aggregate as a policy instrument for monetary policy in Russia. We are also 
aware of the fact that some existing studies attempt to explain inflation 
dynamics by the growth of monetary aggregates (see e.g. Pesonen and 
Korhonen, 1998, Dabrowski et al., 2003) using monetary aggregates as an 
explanatory variable. However, our Granger causality tests indicate that at least 
in the short-run –up to seven months– there is only a Granger causality from 
prices to monetary aggregates, and not the other way around. 
It is widely accepted that the time series data usually suffer some level of 
autocorrelation, and if it is not corrected the estimation results cannot be treated 
as reliable. To correct for the autocorrelation problems, we will use differences 
rather than levels and add several lags, according to information criteria and 
statistical significances of the coefficients. 
Finally, to address the econometric problem caused by several possible 
structural breaks in the Russian economy during the period 1993–2002, we use 
dummy variables. 
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4. Empirical  results 
Data and Methodology 
Data for Russia have to be treated cautiously. The availability is limited and 
phenomena such as dollarization and the barter economy may lead to a 
somewhat biased picture. Some authors (see e.g. Falcetti et al., 2000) also 
believe that the decline in output was overestimated during the first years of the 
transition period.13 In our empirical estimations we use monthly data covering 
the time span 1993-2002. This period has been chosen for data availability 
reasons. Alternatively, in several occasions we use quarterly data to check the 
robustness of our results. The sources of the data are the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics database, the website of the Bank of 
Russia, the monthly database of the Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies (WIIW), and the Russian European Centre for Economic Policy 
(RECEP). For our purposes, we need data on short-term interest rates 
(refinancing rates), consumer price inflation, monetary aggregates, the output 
gap, different exchange rate measures (dollar exchange rate, nominal effective 
exchange rate, and real effective exchange rate), the labor share as a proxy for 
the output gap, and the budget deficit. We use output numbers from RECEP and 
WIIW (industrial production numbers) and deflated them by the monthly 
consumer price inflation, due to the lack of a monthly GDP deflator. 
13  For instance, Åslund (2001) estimates that, for an official figure of just 60.2 percent of the 
Russian 1989 GDP in 1995, the actual figure after taking into account, among other 
things, illegal and under-reported activities, was an amazing 94 percent, or, in other terms, 
a mere marginal GDP loss. 
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Results for the Taylor Rule 
When we estimate an open economy version of the Taylor rule – in levels and in 
differences, the estimated coefficient of inflation is only significant in one 
specification (see Table 1). The estimated coefficient of the output gap does not 
show the expected sign and is insignificant (other proxies of the output gap such 
as the real unit labor cost suggested by Gali and Gertler (1999) also shows 
unsatisfactory results). The estimated coefficients of the exchange rate variables 
are insignificant. The estimated coefficient of the lagged interest rate is equal to 
0.9 and remains relatively stable over the different model specifications, 
indicating that the interest rate in a new period is about 90 percent of the old 
interest rate plus the effect of the other independent variables (in the level 











LR β inf β
LR β
        ( 5 )  
where   is the long-run response on inflation and  is the estimated 
coefficient for year-to-year inflation. We get a long-run response of about 0.3 
and thus the Taylor principle ( >1) does not hold. This means that according 
to our estimations the central bank reacts to a one percent increase of inflation 
with less than a one percent increase in the short-term nominal interest rate 
(decrease in real interest rate). 
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This unsatisfactory result of the output gap might be caused by the facts 
that the objective of the Bank of Russia was limited to inflation and exchange 
rate stabilization or that the real time data significantly differed from the ex-
post-data so that we get a biased picture in our estimations (see e.g. Orphanides, 
2001). Assuming that the Bank of Russia was indeed concerned with the output 
stabilization during this period, we built a real-time series to correct this bias in 
data. We used the yearly output data published in the annual reports of the Bank 
of Russia,14 and on the basis of them constructed a monthly series, interpolating 
and re-basing the available industrial production monthly series from the WIIW. 
When we run regressions using this “real-time” output gap, its estimated 
coefficients are always non-significant and no substantial changes are observed 
in the regressions (we do not present those results). 
Overall, the estimation results suggest that a simple Taylor rule and its 
modifications do not describe well interest rate setting behavior of the Bank of 
Russia. 
Results for the McCallum Rule 
Because of data availability problems for the M1 series, some missing points 
have been recovered by using the M2 series, since these two series are highly 
correlated (over 95 percent).15 We deflated the approximated monetary 
14  For differences between the original WIIW series and the “real-time” series, see Graph 1 
in the Appendix. 
15  The monetary base has is also highly correlated with M1 -89 percent- and its use does not 
change the results. 
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aggregates series with the monthly consumer price index. We expect that the 
signs of the estimated coefficients will be reversed, as a decrease in M1 means a 
monetary contraction and a decrease in the interest rate a monetary expansion. 
The estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant, indicating a poor 
performance of the original McCallum rule as specified in equation (3). 
Moreover, this regression specification has another statistical disadvantage, as it 
requires discarding a large number of observations in order to average the 
velocity of money over the four-year period. Because of this drawback, we 
decided to estimate a modified McCallum rule, where the interest rate 
instrument (of a Taylor type rule) is substituted by a deflated monetary 
aggregate. When we run regressions using the forward interpolated “real-time” 
output gap, the estimated coefficients show always the expected signs and are 
statistically significant for the period from 1994 – 2002 16 (see Table 2).17 
Overall, the estimation results allow us to conclude that the Bank of 
Russia has been targeting monetary aggregates in its policy decisions. At times 
of high inflation pressure, or a positive output gap calculated on the basis of the 
constructed real-time data, the Bank of Russia responded by reducing monetary 
16  Because of the used approximation to real-time data, the results do not necessarily mean 
that the CBR was concerned with output stabilization, but they indicate that this may have 
been the case. Further evidence can only be obtained with actual real-time data, which was 
not available to us. 
17 We can further improve our model by adding a new variable, the growth rate of the Bank 
of Russia’s foreign assets (i.e. reserves), to the regression equation (however, in this case 
we have data only from the mid of 1995: for this reason, we do not show the results). 
Depending on the regression specifications the magnitude of the estimated coefficient 
ranges from 0.16 to 0.19 and is highly significant. Moreover, with this specification we 
obtained improved results for the adjusted R
2, it increased from 0.76 to 0.81 for the same 
sample period. 
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aggregates in real terms, while at times of exchange rate appreciation the policy 
response was an expansionary monetary policy. Moreover, these results are not 
sensitive to the model specification and there are no major statistical problems.  
Testing responses during different time periods 
The Russian economy has experienced different shocks during different time 
periods, and it would be insightful to see whether the Bank of Russia has 
responded differently in different periods. Since the “money based” model 
performs best in the previous estimations, we will test it for different time 
periods.18 First of all, we separate the period before and after 1995, as Chow 
breakpoint tests indicate a structural break at this time (but, peculiarly, not in 
August 1998). We use for this purpose the equation (“full model”, see Table 2) 
of the following type: 
t t t t
t t t t t
u d d d M dollarxr ddollarxr
dollarxr y d M
+ + + + ∆ + + +
+ + + + + + = ∆
− −
−
11 2 10 1 9 1 8 1 7 6
5 4 1 3 2 1 0
)) 1 (log(
inf inf inf )) 1 (log(
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
(8) 
where d is a dummy variable that is one for the period before 1995 and zero 
otherwise, and d1 and d2 are seasonal dummies for December and January over 
the sample period, respectively.  
The estimation results clearly suggest that the Bank of Russia conducted 
different monetary policies before and after 1995. The estimated coefficients 
indicate that before 1995 the Bank of Russia was more concerned with reducing 
18  Briefly, the results of estimating the interest rate rule varying the timeframe are similar to 
the ones obtained before. We can show that the CBR had different policy priorities 
depending on the time period. But the results suffer, again, from insignificance problems.  
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inflation,19 while after 1995 priorities have shifted towards exchange rate 
stabilization. These findings are consistent with the official announcements of 
the Bank of Russia. 
We obtain a similar result when we use a dummy variable for the 
crawling peg period, from October 1994 through August 1998. As one would 
expect, the commitment to react to changes in the exchange rate was greater 
during that period. During the high inflation period, the Bank of Russia attached 
a greater priority to inflation, while at times of relatively low inflation the main 
concern was exchange rate stabilization. 
19  Of course, average inflation before 1995 was also substantially greater than after 1995. 
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5. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper examined the conduct of monetary policy in Russia during the period 
of 1993–2002. We estimated the Taylor rule and the McCallum rule, using both 
monthly and quarterly data. The regression results indicate that a simple Taylor 
rule and its different variations, where the short-term interest rate was used as a 
policy instrument, describes poorly the interest rate setting behavior of the Bank 
of Russia.  
The McCallum rule, where the policy instrument is a monetary aggregate, 
fits best the data. Again, given that the bank of Russia officially adopts a money 
supply as an intermediate anchor to policy and that, even today, its main actual 
instrument of monetary policy are deposit auctions, this is a consistent result. 
Nevertheless, this is in sharp contrast with the recent experience of other 
advanced emerging markets, were interest rate rules produce a good description 
of the policy setting behavior of the monetary authority (see, for instance, 
Mohanty and Klau, 2003, Minella et al., 2003, Torres Garcia, 2003). The 
estimated coefficients are significant and remain unchanged across different 
equation specifications. The results indicate that during the period of 1993–2002 
the Bank of Russia has used monetary aggregates as a main policy instrument in 
conducting monetary policy. Furthermore, the presented results also suggest that 
before 1995 the Bank of Russia was more concerned with inflation reduction, 
while after 1995 the primary objective was exchange rate stabilization. The 
estimation results of the hybrid, or Ball rule, where a weighted average of the 
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interest rate and the exchange rate is used as a policy instrument, draw a mixed 
picture. Depending on the choice of the weights, results change and most of the 
time the estimated coefficients are insignificant. 
The results on our estimations, of course, are backward looking, in the 
sense that they represent the relationships that existed so far in the data. As the 
experience of other advanced emerging markets show, the promotion of forward 
looking behavior among Russian economic agents, aided by the development of 
stronger institutions –especially by the strengthening of the credibility of the 
Bank of Russia and the development of its policy instruments, as indicated by 
the late 2002 reforms, plus the deepening of Russia's financial markets, shall, in 
time, enable the implementation of a successful interest rate policy rule, coupled 
with inflation targeting and a floating exchange rate regime, which shall also 
reduce the GDP costs of disinflation (as Minella et al., 2003, shows for a 
similarly advanced emerging market, which is a also a large economy, with an 
important primary sector and a history of macro instability, namely, the Federal 
Republic of Brazil)20. 
20  As a sign of this, Taylor rule regressions run only for the period after 2000, do show the 
expected signs for the variables, but most of them are non-significant (also, one must 
caution that this is a very short period and that the number of observations is therefore 
very limited). 
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R  square  0.94 0.94 0.10 0.10 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.94 0.94 0.06 0.04 
Durbin Watson 
statistics 
2.54 2.56 2.19 2.16 
Breusch-
Godfrey test 
No rejection  No rejection  No rejection  No rejection 
Notes:  
-The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM-test (with no autocorrelation as a null 
hypothesis) was conducted for twelve lags. 
- (-1) indicates a first lag. 
-The effective sample period is 1993:3 – 2002:12 since we lose two months because of lags 
and differences. 
-
1) In this model the refinancing rate in differences is the dependent variable. Inflation rates 
and the lagged interest rate are used in differences too. 
-Standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate levels of significance a 10 (*), 
5(**) or 1 (***) percent level. 
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Table 2: Testing a McCallum rule for Russia, 1993-2002. 
















Monthly inflation  -0.0017 
(0.0015) 
Output gap (real time 
data – forward 
interpolation) 
-0.0022 
(0.0009) **   
Dummy (for period 
before 1995) * monthly 
inflation 
-0.0050 
(0.0020) **  Output gap (ex post 
data)    -0.0006 
(0.0010) 
Monthly inflation (-1)  -0.0013 
(0.0007) * 


















Growth in bilateral 
dollar exchange rate 
-0.2920 
(0.0846) *** 






Pre-1995 Dummy for 
growth in bilateral dollar 
exchange rate 
0.2701 






Growth in bilateral 
dollar exchange rate (-1) 
0.1107 
(0.0480) ** 






Growth rate of M1(-1)   0.2821 
(0.0666) ***  R square  0.78  0.77 
Seasonal dummy for 
January 
-0.1294 
(0.0130) ***  Adjusted R square  0.76  0.75 





statistics  2.03 1.98 




R square  0.76 
Adjusted R square  0.74 
Durbin Watson statistics  1.97 
Breusch-Godfrey test  No rejection 
Notes: 
-The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM-test (with no autocorrelation as a null 
hypothesis) was conducted for twelve lags. 
-(-1) indicates a first lag 
-The effective sample period is 1993:3 – 2002:12 since we lose two months because of lags 
and differences. 
-
1) In this case we deduct the HP-trend from quarter-to-quarter inflation and the growth in the 
dollar exchange rate. 
-Standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate levels of significance at 10 (*), 
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